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1. Introduction 
In German literary history, the reception of Friedrich Nicolai (1773-1811) is still 
under the spell of the refusal which Nicolai met from classicists and romanticists like 
Goethe and Schiller, August Wilhelm Schlegel, and Johann Gottlieb Fichte.1 This 
verdict still prevails in many judgments on Nicolai today. However, I argue that two 
relevant texts by Nicolai contributed to a debate that produced seminal arguments not 
only on the question of reason versus emotion but also on the question of whether and 
how Enlightenment needed to determine its boundaries. Both texts are usually 
considered relatively simplistic attacks on Protestant orthodoxy and on Catholic 
bigotry, but they also happen to be striking examples for the specific relationship 
between Enlightenment and imagination in the last third of the 18th century. 
 
2. Sebaldus Nothanker 
Nicolai’s novel Das Leben und die Meinungen des Herrn Magister Sebaldus 
Nothanker (1773-75) demonstrates that the tension between an imagination that is 
hard to control and the real world can be leveled out in literature. Here, it is possible 
to reintegrate a type of knowledge that is more than rational into the empiricist 
method of producing knowledge. Researchers have often read this novel as a critique 
of religious enthusiasm that plainly and ironically shows how eccentric any kind of 
religious enthusiasm can be. The novel is a satirical attack on sanctimonious Pietists, 
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on orthodox hubris, on dogmatic intolerance and on the “Verfolgungsgeist” of the 
Protestant church.2 But since this novel is also an attempt to practice Enlightenment 
through satire, as Horst Möller says,3 I propose to take into consideration the means of 
the satire, i.e. the narrative level. 
 
In the preface of his novel, Nicolai claims to continue Moritz August von Thümmel’s 
epic poem Wilhelmine, but he also constructs a contradiction towards this ‘hypertext’. 
Whereas the author of the poem is said to be a poet who did not attempt to obey the 
correct chronology and did not try to keep his narrative free from all fiction 
(“Erdichtung”), the narrator of Sebaldus promises to give a “veritable biography”, 
based on complete evidence.4 He claims to tell a “veritable history”, in which one 
must not look for “those bold flights of imagination, which constitute the essence of 
poetry”.5 The plot of the text is said to consist of ordinary everyday events. The 
narrator reaffirms this claim several pages later. Unlike Voltaire, he says, truth is 
supposed to be the essence of this story, “we shall in no one instance [...] 
misrepresent[...] or forge[...] events, in order to render our narrative more interesting 
and delectable.”6 But the story of the novel is not capable of affirming these claims. It 
is evident that the narrator plays with the dichotomy of fiction and truth that was of 
high significance to the debate on the novel in the 18th century.7 Therefore, the 
devaluation of imagination here happens in the mode of a fictional statement which 
claims to be true, but evidently is not ‘true’ in an extra-literary sense. Nicolai 
ironically plays with the reader’s expectations and the pseudo-pretension of truth.8 
The plot of the novel is not even plausible; it is a series of improbable, surprising, 
contingent events that follow a pattern of improbability more than a pattern of reality. 
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Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that what the characters say in this novel is 
a diegetic event. As the characters by no means display only rational, enlightened 
behavior, imagination itself is connected to the complex of concepts forming the 
Enlightenment. It cannot be separated from the search for truth and Enlightenment, 
because it is an anthropological condition that cannot be denied – a condition, though, 
that has its limits. Imagination cannot give evidence for truth yet it contributes to the 
progress of Enlightenment. 
 
In the novel, enlightening the home country is described as mandatory for academic 
disciplines.9 The duty of the scholars is to disperse Enlightenment to the people. 
Sebaldus optimistically supposes that this is also the inner need of savants.10 But here, 
his conversational partner, an expert in the contemporary book market, uncovers the 
discrepancy between his ideal and the real world. Sebaldus’s ideas are nothing but a 
‘play of the imagination’ which does not match empirical perception: “Your 
imagination, my dear friend, still soars a world too high. Vouchsafe to descend a step 
or two, and come a little nearer to our earth.”11 Imagination produces an 
understanding of Enlightenment that differs largely from reality because the idea of 
enlightening the public contrasts the market rules of capitalism. The main principle of 
all booksellers is economic success: “Believe me, my friend, the taste of your great 
literati does not suit the palate of the public. Now the bookseller, if he is to live by his 
trade, needs a great number of customers.”12 This is said by the bookseller 
Hieronymus who was identified as Nicolai’s mouthpiece. Scholarly Enlightenment 
cannot be easily transferred to the populace because the people are not interested in 
science and because the booksellers are more interested in economic gain than in 
ideals.13 The narrator does not criticize the goal of enlightening the people. He claims 
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to carefully consider the means of Enlightenment according to the anthropological 
conditions of every human being and according to real society. The main concern of 
the novel is, in fact, to demonstrate the practical contradictions of the Enlightenment 
utopia.14 
 
But there seems to be a solution: “It is not sufficient that every science be digested 
into a separate system; – every particular branch ought to be adapted to the whole, and 
all of them collectively applied to the use and benefit of mankind.”15 Science can be 
utilized to have an impact on society. However, this transfer needs to face the 
relevance of imagination in the real world. Even Wilhelmine, Sebaldus’s wife, who is 
interested in the Enlightenment and has read rationalist philosophers like Wolff, 
cannot deny that it is not reason that convinces her but rather her imagination when 
reading the Enlightenment writer Thomas Abbt. “It completely heated her 
imagination, which was naturally romantic. She felt enchanted at the reflection, […] 
Burning with these sublime ideas, […].”16 The imagination of the “passionate admirer 
of the Belles Lettres” produces her enthusiasm. But emotions and even imagination do 
not stand in contrast to self-reflexion.17 
 
Nicolai’s novel does not only demonstrate that private and public reason need to be 
connected but it also represents the realistic premise that reason and rationality have 
to be complemented by emotions and by a moderate, “reasonable” imagination. 
Imagination is not merely criticized. By characterizing figures and situations, Nicolai 
sketches the model of a balanced imagination including both its negative and its 
positive corollaries. He does not deny that imagination is an inevitable and necessary 
part of human thinking. Whereas, by means of a pathological imagination, phantasies 
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replace affects, cause physical illness and even death18 and sentimental imagination is 
uncovered and ridiculed in Säugling’s “niedlichen Imaginatiönchen,”19 the narrator 
depicts positive corollaries of imagination: Mariane’s reading heats up an imagination 
that represents emotions more clearly, intensely und fiercely than usual. Although 
extensive reading can also lead to laziness and passivity, a well-balanced imagination 
does not only not contradict the Enlightenment but enables its progress. 
 
Even religious diversity and tolerance can result from imagination as we can see in 
Nicolai’s description of the religious situation in Berlin. Imagination (although 
sometimes exaggerated) has produced a variety of religious attitudes that result in 
tolerance. In order to be productive, imagination needs to connect with warmth and 
true emotion. But imagination is always in danger of being engaged by impure 
intentions. It must not be isolated. “Verstandloses Gefühl” must not decide on 
“philosophische Wahrheit,” and “verwirrtes Träumen einer angebrannten 
Einbildungskraft” is not the “höchste Schwung der Dichterey.”20 Mariane’s kidnapper 
reads Samuel Richardsons’s Clarissa in order to set fire to his imagination through 
the character of Lovelace.21 Imagination may also remain a utopia or pure 
“speculation” that counts on attitudes more than on behavior.22 An immediate transfer 
to practical knowledge seems hard to find. A Magister from Leipzig chastises 
Sebaldus: “Tis yourself rather that are dreaming of Utopia; of the beautiful regions of 
imagination, […].”23 But imagination becomes a part of this criticism because of the 
limits of human reason, because thinking in this real world does not work as pure 
reason, because imagination is part of the human condition. In this novel, the 
empiricist Nicolai relies on a well-balanced model of imagination and reason in order 
to provide a real-world model of Enlightenment. This understanding of human 
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behavior seems more adequate than rational philosophy to describe what really 
happens. Imagination usually does not exaggerate. It is balanced by the reason of 
every human being, as shown in the character of Mariane. 
 
She is depicted as a new kind of bourgeois woman who, as a self-thinker and a 
woman in love, combining a tempered imagination with practical reasoning and an 
interest in sentimental literature with a pragmatic access to what is apt and possible. 
Moreover, Mariane’s mix of imagination and reasoning fuels the story. She tries to 
forget Säugling because she intends to follow a rationally based morality. But: “Yet 
the very attempt to confirm her resolution imprinted his memory still more indelibly 
in her heart, and she rendered her determination abortive by the very means she took 
to carry it into effect.”24 The effect of imagination is limited by the constant conflict 
between reason, imagination, and other affects and emotions. Nicolai designs a 
balanced model that limits imagination through reason and a reasonable morality, but 
that also sets limits to reason by imagination and imagined utopias. This combination 
contributes to the progress of the Enlightenment. By denying philosophical systems 
and stressing the practical relevance of a well-balanced imagination, the novel 
contributes to the self-reflection of the Enlightenment. 
 
3. Beschreibung einer Reise 
Nicolai’s multi-volume report on his travels through Southern Germany and Austria, 
Beschreibung einer Reise (1783-1787 / 1795-1796), draws much stronger contrasts 
between imagination and Enlightenment. In the preface and in the first volume, the 
author claims that by traveling one can free oneself from prejudices. If the people 
would travel, they would notice “that in all countries there is good and bad” and “they 
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would learn to tolerate and love each other.”25 In the first volume, finding the truth 
seems to be connected with the process of reflection and the public dispute: “The 
more you reflect, meditate, compare, are confronted with objections, the more truth 
unfolds.”26 Unlike this ideal of debate, Nicolai, in the subsequent volumes, renders his 
empiricist program of truth more and more absolute: The acquisition of knowledge is 
only possible through experience, and this experience produces reliable truth by 
unbiased observation and trustworthy information. In consequence, Nicolai 
painstakingly tries to avoid elements of fiction by relying on what he takes for facts, 
data, and findings.27 The world is the object of reasonable understanding and practical 
action, not of “dreaming antiquarians.”28 Following this presumption, Nicolai 
observes knowledge, industry (i.e. industria), religion, and manners of the countries 
he travels. Nicolai does not even experience nature and landscape with emotion, he 
gauges them methodically.29 
 
Nicolai’s method remains to a certain extent incomplete: In his Beschreibung einer 
Reise, he is bound to the premise that his own empirically based knowledge cannot be 
disputed.30 Objectivity is the main goal he attempts to achieve by adding numerous 
documents, partly as voluminous attachments. In this empirical process of collection 
and registration, he tries to avoid premature judgments by regularly reminding himself 
of the difference between observation and evaluation. Therefore, the “Ideen-Einheit”31 
of the observer needs to be complemented by observations by others in order to result 
in truth in the end. Nicolai claims to have done this during his journey. 
 
His judgments concerning the role of imagination differ largely from his literary 
work. Nicolai now declines all imagination because it is said to be nothing but 
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enthusiasm. Imagination contrasts logic with morality. “All healthy concepts of logic 
and morality must be confused if someone wants to imagine things like that (the late 
Jesuit practice of indulgence, R.G.).”32 Nicolai generalizes: Every aberration from 
reason, including all imagination, contradicts the Enlightenment. He uses this 
argument in order to criticize Catholicism for constraining the people, for preventing 
them from thinking freely. Programmatically, he tries to justify his critical view of 
Catholicism by stressing the decisive role of emotions and imagination in Catholic 
practices. “Dark feelings and blind faith” are, according to Nicolai, “prevalent; 
publicity and openness are being prevented, reason is humiliated.”33 Imagination, 
emotion, superstition, and the sway of the clergy suppress human reason in the 
Catholic regions, as they have done for centuries. Enlightenment, according to 
Nicolai’s travel report, needs to be reduced to clear dichotomies in order to be able to 
detect its opponents. As a result of this clear dichotomy, imagination moves over into 
the camp of threats to the Enlightenment. 
 
Nicolai quotes Moses Mendelssohn’s definition of “Bildung”, “Aufklärung”, and 
“Kultur.”34 But in order to dillineate the Enlightenment’s territory, Nicolai reduces 
Mendelssohn’s “philosophy of balance” to the concept of rational free-thinking. In 
Nicolai’s report, the level of public reflection on all objects of human life which 
influence the welfare of every individual and of the whole indicates the degree of 
Enlightenment. Nicolai denies the usefulness of imagination in this process. 
“Imagination jumps, creates at will, wants to have effects before the causes exist, sees 
nothing as it is but only as it desires to see it, wants to have it even better, becomes 
angry when it is not perceived by others to be so, and imagines that it were so.”35 This 
clearly contradicts Mendelssohn who argues that Enlightenment sometimes needs 
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opposition and that emotions and imagination are part of our reasoning.36 
Mendelssohn and Nicolai both agree on the goal of spreading the Enlightenment. Yet 
although Nicolai admits the relativity of culture which must be harmonized with the 
constitution and with the nation’s character, although he declares in his travel journal 
that knowledge is always historical,37 although he aims at merging empiricist 
epistemology with rationality,38 there is one seminal difference: The means of 
achieving and spreading knowledge, according to Nicolai, must not be affected by 
irrationality or any aspect – like imagination – which leads away from truth and 
reason. 
 
Consequently, Nicolai tries to use clear evidence in order to win over the readers of 
his travel report. In order to convince the reader of the ‘natural truth’ he has detected, 
he uses diagrams and statistical data extensively throughout, e.g. on birth and death 
rates, on public finances and taxes, even on the prices for postal horses. These are the 
results of his empirical research, and we cannot deny that he had a lot of new insights 
into real life in the late 18th century. But Nicolai not only presents this empirical data 
in a new form: the world he sees is sorted, analyzed, classified, and encyclopedically 
annotated.39 Unlike in Sebaldus Nothanker, in Nicolai’s Beschreibung einer Reise the 
author himself gives order and meaning to knowledge. He no longer relies on a reader 
who needs to enlighten himself by reflecting on the positions of the figures in the 
novel and trying to find out for himself what position is consistent with the progress 
of the Enlightenment. By radicalizing the empiricist principle, one endangers the 
possibility of a self-reflective and skeptical reassessment of the order that the author 
had created.40 
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4. Climate Changes 
Both texts attempt to position themselves in the current social field without dismissing 
the core goals of the Enlightenment. The changes in Nicolai’s understanding of 
Enlightenment can be read as contributions to the larger debate on the scope, 
implementation, and boundaries of the Enlightenment, whether they be set by its 
advocates or by its opponents. There are eight years between the publication of 
volume 8 and volume 9 of Nicolai’s Beschreibung einer Reise – from 1787 to 1795.  
 
In the meantime, the intellectual climate in Berlin had vastly changed. In the preface 
to his 4th edition of Sebaldus (1799), Nicolai describes this change: “No one could 
imagine that there would come a time when even in Berlin the public power should 
try to prevent the Enlightenment of religion and the application of common sense to 
the most important issues of human life.”41 This is of central relevance for Nicolai’s 
assessment of the political and social situation in the late 1780s and 1790s. In between 
were the conservative attacks on Enlightenment, for example Wöllner’s edicts.  
 
Moreover, some conservatives tried to instrumentalize the balanced models of 
Enlightenment which maintained that truth needs to be found by every individual and 
must not be prescribed by the public, whereas others returned directly to an over-
exaggerated imagination and to mysticism.42 Thus, it is not only Catholicism whose 
disproportionate, unlimited imagination may endanger Enlightenment. According to 
Nicolai, Enlightenment is endangered when the connection between reason and 
emotion in the well-balanced model he proposes is being broken by someone trying to 
rely on only one of these aspects or – even worse – on authority. Those anti-
enlightening tendencies force the Enlightenment onto the defense. Nicolai 
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increasingly fears that a new irrationalism will arise and gain authority as a principle 
of state and ecclesiastical leadership – a principle that contrasts to what Nicolai 
thought was the well-balanced principle of Enlightenment. It seemed inevitable to 
strengthen one’s own principles by minimizing the ambiguities (such as the balanced 
role of imagination). 
 
Nicolai always remained interested in emphasizing practical knowledge. For this, he 
needed to use diverse, even contradictory means. Nicolai’s insistence on this eclectic 
position may also resemble narrow-mindedness.43 But he postulated that every human 
being is responsible for society’s progress towards Enlightenment. Thus, society 
needs to guarantee the freedom of thought and public debate. This public debate 
should include imagination as it constitutes a seminal part of practical human 
cognition.44 Nevertheless, Nicolai still holds to the idea that there are various paths to 
truth – even in his travel report: “There are many paths that lead to truth, but no one 
really reaches it. This would be the end of all philosophy and research.”45 
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